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Abstract—The COVID-19 pandemic is expected to have a severe 
socio-economic impact with significant losses of GDP and high 
unemployment rates. As a result, governments worldwide are 
attempting to mitigate these impacts through government 
intervention. One major method of alleviating the socio-economic 
impact has been to reschedule or defer loan and mortgage 
payments to ease the burden off borrowers and mitigate a 
massive wave of defaults. In other words, the governments are 
attempting to impose a degree of risk-sharing in the economy. 
This paper debates the advantages of risk-sharing practices in 
the financial system in times of economic crisis, and argue that 
this should instead become the norm in the financial system and 
not only in times of economic downturns or pandemics. This 
paper further highlights that, although the principle of risk-
sharing is enshrined in Islamic finance, many Islamic loans and 
mortgages do not reflect risk-sharing in practice. Instead, only a 
few genuine examples exist that actually do apply risk-sharing. 
These examples should be taken as best-practice models 
substituting the pervasive risk-transfer model that in times of 
crisis burdens the borrower in specific, and the entire society 
through government interference in general. 
Keywords- Profit-sharing, risk-sharing, COVID-19, 
government interference, public aid 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The COVID-19 pandemic had affected over 150 countries 
by the end of March 2020 with many countries initiating stay-
at-home measures (lockdowns) and curfews as well as closing 
down most aspects of public life [1]& [2]. The effects of 
COVID-19 are expected to have far-reaching effects, first and 
foremost in the loss of lives occurred and expected. 
As a second effect
1
, the socio-economic impact is expected 
to be severe, with losses of up to 2.4% of global GDP expected 
in 2020 [3]. This has prompted many countries to intervene 
economically in an attempt to mitigate the worst socio-
economic effects of this crisis. For example, the European 
Parliament has issued a “Corona Response Investment 
Initiative” ensuring funds “will go to healthcare systems, small 
                                                          
1 Although I count it as “second”, one must clearly state that loss of human 
lives cannot be comparable to any socio-economic damages on any humane 
scale. 
and medium-sized firms, labour markets and other vulnerable 
parts of EU countries’ economies” [4] & [5]. Similarly, the 
United States Senate has passed the “Coronavirus Aid, Relief, 
and Economic Security Act” promising $2.2 trillion, with 
almost half ($1.17 trillion USD) earmarked for businesses in 
the form of loans or tax cuts, while funding for hospitals and 
healthcare was budgeted at $180 billion [6].Other countries 
followed suit such as Turkey with a $15.4 billion plan [19] and 
Japan followed in the first week of April, with a stimulus 
package surpassing 20% of Japanese GDP [18]. It is expected 
that by the end of the crisis, many countries will enact similar 
measures. 
These public measures to address the socio-economic 
impact highlight an important drawback of our current 
economic and financial system: Our financial contracts lack 
any and all aspects of risk-sharing. It is therefore the objective 
of this paper to debate the drawbacks of the lack of risk-
sharing, and show the merits of risk-sharing in the context of 
the current crisis, i.e., how risk-sharing could have helped 
mitigate much of the negative socio-economic impacts of this 
crisis. 
Most importantly, risk-sharing would have allowed 
governments to play a much less intervening role in the 
economic sphere. This paper does not claim to dictate the 
extent of the role governments should play, but only argues 
that the required monetary aid would have been lower if risk-
sharing was more prominent.The methodology of this paper is 
qualitative in nature and deals with the issue in an exploratory 
fashion. The problem is tackled by debating the advantages and 
disadvantages of risk-sharing in theory and practice. 
The main contribution of this paper is to connect the 
recently growing literature on risk-sharing during COVID-19 
with the principle of risk-sharing in Islamic finance which 
seems to have been lost amongst the newest literature on the 
matter. As will be shown briefly below, a number of recent 
studies on contributions on the issue from well-known entities 
are struggling with the idea of risk-sharing and trying to 
identify its problems, although this has all been extensively 
researched in Islamic finance over the years. 
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II. THE PRINCIPLE OF RISK SHARING 
In the second policy brief of the Economics for Inclusive 
Prosperity series, AnatAdmati rightly begins her essay with the 
sentence “A healthy and stable financial system enables 
efficient resource allocation and risk sharing” [7], and in 
another article by the author the idea of risk-sharing as an 
alternative to debt was discussed in more details [8]. However, 
it is still worth mentioning what is meant by this principle:  
Fundamentally, risk sharing means that the fates of both the 
borrower and lender should be tied together. Borrower and 
lender should gain income only in positive economic 
situations, and both share the risk in adverse economic 
situations. Risk-sharing of this nature reflects the essence of 
fairness and Shariah-compliance in respect to financial dealings 
and ensures that no party is taken advantage of due to their 
financial position in the contract. 
In this sense, mortgages and loans would be tied to the 
income/earnings of the borrower, and if it would so happen that 
the borrower loses all sources of income due to an external 
factor, such as a worldwide pandemic, the lender would be in 
no position to demand any payments since they are both in a 
risk-sharing contract. 
Similarly, one must remember that public financing 
operates in a similar way in almost all tax codes: The 
government will not collect taxes from firms and companies 
affected by the shutdown to the extent that they make no 
profits. This is not a new behavior conditional on the current 
crisis, but is simply how taxation works. If the taxpayer loses 
their source of income, they are no longer required to pay 
taxes. 
This stands in stark contrast to a conventional interest-
based personal loan where the bank requires interest payments 
during both positive and adverse economic situations equally, 
thereby isolating the bank from sharing in the risks of the 
borrower (unless the borrower defaults completely). Therefore, 
the conventional interest-based system is based on risk-
transfer, where the bank transfers the entire risk of repayment 
to the customer, and can sit back and expect its legal right to 
receive interest regardless of external economic conditions. 
III. EXAMPLES OF GENUINE RISK-SHARING IN PRACTICE 
How would such a contract look like in practice? One can 
find a very small number of companies that actually apply 
these ideas. 
A. Risk-sharing Employment 
Some restaurants that do not offer wages, but instead offer 
a form of profit-sharing compensation. If the restaurant faces 
an economic downturn (or a pandemic occurs), the employer 
would not be required to decide between laying off employees, 
or paying them their full-wage. Instead, the employer is only 
required to share in profits that are received – if any exist. In a 
case study of one of these restaurants, it was found that this 
system enhances productivity and motivation of the employees 
without overburdening the employer (see [9]). 
B. Risk-sharing Student Loans 
A number of student loan organizations, often supported by 
governments, apply the risk-sharing principle by providing 
college students with funding, in return for a portion of the 
students’ income upon full-time employment. In this sense, 
once again, the student is not required to make payments if 
they are currently unemployed, thus removing a major source 
of burden if economic downturns occur (For example see [10]). 
C. Risk-sharing Personal Loans 
Some private companies or investors provide financing to 
individuals in return for a set portion of their future incomes. 
As a result, no payments are required if the borrower is laid off 
due to an economic downturn (or an ongoing pandemic). On 
the other hand, higher payments are due if the borrower is 
promoted during the term of the contract (For example [11]). 
IV. RISK-SHARING DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 
Though these examples are currently the exception rather 
than the rule, one can see the advantages of such a system, 
which ensures fairness by not imposing undue burdens on 
borrowers. The latest policies conducted by the United States 
show how necessary risk-sharing is to alleviating the economic 
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic: The Coronavirus Aid, 
Relief and Economic Security Act forces banks to share the 
risk of their borrowers by allowing forbearance of up to 60 
days, extendable for four 30-day periods for anyone with a 
federally backed mortgage loan facing financial hardship 
during the crisis. No fees, penalties or additional interest are 
charged for the delays. In other words, payments are simply 
deferred to a later time when economic conditions are kinder to 
the borrower. The Act also instructs that student loan payments 
be suspended without penalty or accruing interest through 
September 30th, and provides loans to mid-sized businesses 
while requiring no payments during the first six months after 
loan issuance [12] & [13]. Similar measures have also been 
taken by the Italian government, which is allowing self-
employed and freelancers with mortgages to suspend their 
payments for up to 18 months if they can prove a reduction in 
income by at least one-third. This will also be applied to 
commercial rents of business that have been forced to close 
down [14]. The Japanese and Turkish governments are 
reported to have instructed banks and insurance companies to 
defer payments and dues for 3-6 months [18] & [19]. 
Risk-sharing is also becoming relevant on an international 
scale, with EU countries suggesting different ways to share 
risk, whether medical risks, or default risks on their sovereign 
debt [22]. 
In a recently published article, Ainsworth & McKenzie 
highlight uses of risk-sharing in higher education in the United 
Kingdom, giving examples of “equity” based funding programs 
that have been encouraged or actually used and their benefits 
during the COVID-19 crisis [21]. 
In an article for Allianz Global Investors, it is stated that 
short-term lending as conducted by banks is witnessing a drop 
due to COVID-19 and as an alternative “partnering for long-
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term growth” must be encouraged especially for funding of 
SMEs. They further state that “partnerships that divide up the 
risk-return rewards” are required [20]. It is however worth 
mentioning that this article was published in July 2020, while 
the ideas of risk-sharing have been suggested long before these 
observations during COVID-19 were made (see examples for 
risk-sharing in social financing [23], examples in crowdfunding 
[24]. 
Not only is this idea being considered and put into practice 
by government entities, but also private mortgage providers are 
considering plans to suspend mortgage payments during the 
pandemic, however long it may last [15] & [16].  
On a global level, the IMF explicitly encourages loan 
modifications to allow for payment rescheduling, mentioning 
clearly that these measures are not only meant to benefit 
borrowers, but even lenders will gain by avoiding high default 
rates which could lead to a major crisis such was witnessed in 
2008 [17]. 
It is important to mention that the current risk-transfer 
business model of banks does have advantages as well: It offers 
plannability and the enticing idea of always receiving a profit 
regardless what is happening in the economy, i.e., banks are 
contractually owed their interest payments and could in theory 
sue for their rights and foreclose people’s homes for defaulting 
on their mortgages. However, the 2008 financial crisis and the 
current pandemic both highlight the magnitude of the 
advantages of the risk-sharing system over the advantages of 
the risk-transfer system, namely the ability to avoid defaults 
even if that comes at the cost of reduced plannability and a 
non-constant payment stream. One should remember that the 
financial system deals in reduced plannability and non-constant 
payment streams on a regular basis anyway, namely in equity 
investments. Not only are the advantages of risk-sharing 
economic, but also for society [8]. 
V. CRITIQUE OF ISLAMIC LOANS AND MORTGAGES 
On a side note, it is important to mention that the principle 
of risk-sharing is the key to achieve these improvements, and 
not simply Islamic financial contracts since these do not always 
include elements of risk-sharing [27]. For example, some 
Islamic mortgage contracts conducted through Financing Lease 
(Ijarah muntahia Bittamlik), Installment Purchase with Mark-
Up (Murabahah), or even Diminishing Partnership 
(Diminishing Musharakah) do not ensure the fairness of a risk-
sharing structure. These contracts demand stable equal 
payments along the lifetime of the contract and do not – in their 
contractual form – allow for payment rescheduling or 
suspension during times of crisis for the borrower. In other 
words, these contracts in their current form are just as harmful 
to the economy during times of crisis as conventional loans and 
mortgages in terms of the overall burden to the borrower, 
which can eventually lead to massive defaults. 
As one study out of Pakistan shows, Islamic bank managers 
worry about regulatory issues in terms of overexposure to 
equity and tend to minimize such contracts as much as possible 
[26]. 
A relevant critique, even though not entirely addressed at 
Islamic loans, is mentioned in the article on risk-sharing in 
higher education in the UK, Ainsworth & McKenzie highlight 
that a degree of moral hazard exists within risk-sharing 
products which must be regulated and considered in the 
product design [21]. This is also supported by a recent IMF 
working paper [22] as well as recent publications within the 
Islamic finance literature [25]. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this paper is to highlight the advantages of risk-
sharing practices in the financial system in times of economic 
crisis. Although the economic measures taken by governments 
worldwide to lessen the economic burden of the crisis are 
indeed an aspect of risk-sharing, they are meant to only be 
temporary. I argue that this should instead become the norm to 
alleviate socio-economic consequences, not only of the current 
pandemic, but during any economic downturn which could 
overburden borrowers causing massive defaults which may 
force government interference. One must always remember 
that government intervention is, in its essence, sharing of risk 
among all taxpayers. 
This paper further highlights that, although the principle of 
risk-sharing is enshrined in Islamic finance, many Islamic 
loans and mortgages do not reflect risk-sharing in practice. 
Instead, only a few genuine examples exist that actually do 
apply risk-sharing. These examples should be taken as best-
practice models substituting the pervasive risk-transfer model 
that in times of crisis only burdens the borrower in specific, or 
the entire society through government interference in general. 
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